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Introduction
There is ample evidence that individual well-being is affected by comparisons with others.
Status concerns are an important feature of our social existence. Higher ranked individuals are on average healthier (Wilkinson, 2000 , Marmot, 2003 and live longer (Oswald and Rablen, 2008) than lower ranked ones. They also report higher levels of happiness in survey questions (Di Tella at al., 2007) . Relatedly, actions of others provide a "frame of reference" for own decisions (Frank, 1991) . As Karl Marx (1847) famously noted, "A house may be large or small; as long as the neighboring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut."
For the economist, such positional concerns and frame of reference effects are important, as they can lead to inefficient market outcomes. For example, resources spent on improving one's status are wasteful from a societal point of view, as one person's gain is another person's loss. As Layard (1980) puts it "For, though individuals are willing to make sacrifices to improve their individual position, the net result of status-motivated action will be no increase in status satisfaction but an increase in sacrifice. " (p. 738) . Perhaps the best studied example of such wasteful competition occurs in the presence of relative consumption effects, i.e. if an individual's utility depends not only on the level of her own consumption but also on how that level compares with the consumption of others.
One cause of such interdependence has been explored by Veblen (1899) who, referring to the behavior of the nouveau riche during the Second Industrial Revolution in Britain, coined the term of "conspicuous consumption". He argued that this consumption "is evidence of wealth, and thus becomes honorific, and . . . failure to consume a mark of demerit." Veblen thus singles out consumption that is intently used as a signal for status. More broadly, 1 conspicuous consumption refers to any consumption activity that is, first, literally "visible" to outsiders, and, second, positional, in the sense that own consumption utility depends partly on relative rather than absolute consumption.
Despite the obvious interest for microeconomic theory (e.g. Layard, 1980 , Dupor and Liu, 2003 , Arrow and Dasgupta, 2009 , and the widespread reference to the concept in the economic literature, there is surprisingly little direct empirical evidence on the effect of conspicuous consumption on well-being of others. The objective of this paper is to contribute such evidence within the context of the life satisfaction literature, in order to provide direct empirical quantifications of the presence and size of consumption externalities. I propose to use information on what people say when asked whether they have a good and worthwhile life, i.e., survey information on "subjective well-being", "satisfaction", or "happiness", in order to estimate the effect of conspicuous consumption on others' satisfaction, and thus the utility loss due to such consumption. The empirical approach using satisfaction equations is in the spirit of previous papers concerned with the valuation of intangibles, including van 1 The second, obtained from the Federal Tax Administration, includes information on average incomes and income inequality, again for each municipality, canton and year.
The statistical hypothesis being tested is that income and life satisfaction are not related to the local or regional density of new luxury sport cars, ceteris paribus, against the alternative that there is a negative association. The empirical analysis employs linear regression models with fixed individual specific as well as region specific effects.
Background

Modeling conspicuous car consumption
The following model, an adaptation of Dupor and Liu (2003) , provides a useful framework for thinking about conspicuous car consumption. Let c denote own consumption of car attributes (such as horsepower, or looks) andc the average attributes in the population of 1 A municipality is the smallest administrative and political unit in Switzerland. Depending on size, it can be a village, town or city.
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cars. The utility function of identical consumers can be written as
where x is a non-conspicuous composite good. Suppose that people enjoy horsepower (∂U/∂c = U 1 > 0) as well as non-conspicuous consumption (∂U/∂x = U 3 > 0), that marginal utility is diminishing (∂ 2 U/∂c 2 < 0, ∂ 2 U/∂x 2 < 0), and that horsepower consumption is conspicuous and generates envy (∂U/∂c = U 2 < 0). People then choose c and x in order to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
where y f is income at full employment and leisure is part of x. Substituting the constraint into utility function (1), individuals thus maximize
where g(c) = (y f − c)/p. They take public consumptionc as given and trade off the marginal utility from own conspicuous consumption with the marginal utility from non-conspicuous consumption. The first-order condition for a maximum is
It is a-priori undetermined whether public consumptionc affects the solution to (3), and hence what the optimal own consumption levels for c and x are. For example, the marginal rate of substitution between conspicuous and non-conspicuous consumption is independent of c if the utility function is either additively separable, or multiplicative (e.g. of Cobb-Douglas form) inc. In these cases, envy has no behavioral consequences although it lowers a person's utility. In other cases, consumption comparisons can lead to behavioral responses. Suppose, for example, that an increase inc raises the marginal utility of conspicuous consumption relative to that of non-conspicuous consumption. As a consequence, it is optimal to reduce non-conspicuous consumption (including leisure, i.e. work more, for example) and to increase own conspicuous consumption. In such a case, it is in principle possible to infer the presence of a consumption externality from observed behavior. In general, behavioral data cannot prove the absence of envy effects for the stated reasons. Suppose instead that U (c,c, g(c))
can be measured empirically. Then it becomes possible to determine the effect ofc on U , if any, using statistical methods.
Learning about such envy effects is important from a policy perspective, as they result in an inefficient allocation in general, and "overconsumption" in particular. To see this, note that in a symmetric equilibrium with c =c, we obtain
This equilibrium is inefficient, since individuals do not account for the negative externality U 2 (c, c, g(c)) they impose on others. The social optimum requires that
Assuming concavity of U (c, c, g(c)), the optimal car consumption c * that solves (4) is less than equilibrium consumption, an instance of overconsumption. A government imposing a luxury tax can remove or alleviate this inefficiency.
The underlying assumption of identical consumers is admittedly unrealistic, as every person would then buy cars with similar attributes, whereas in reality Ferraris and Porsches are only bought by few people. Changing the model in order to allow for heterogeneity in endowments (whereby "rich" people would have a greater demand for c) would not change the essential mechanisms leading to overconsumption.
Empirical literature
Consumption In this paper, the focus is instead on the second group of people. Traditionally, economists have analyzed the effects of consumption externalities based on revealed preferences, i.e., by studying changes in behavior. For example, as shown above, an increase in comparison consumption can affect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption of conspicuous and non-conspicuous goods, thereby changing observed choices. Specifically, an increase in reference consumption can lead to an outward shift in labor supply and an increase in own consumption, an effect known as "Keeping up with the Joneses" (Frank, 1999) . A well known study along this line is Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) who show that a woman's employment probability increases if the sister's husband's income is greater than the own husband's income. More recently, Kuhn et al. (2011) show that living next to a winner in the Dutch Postcode Lottery increases the level of own car consumption. Even if an externality 6 leaves the marginal rate of substitution between conspicuous and non-conspicuous goods unchanged, other margins can be affected, for example, those related to residential choice.
Since conspicuous consumption can be interpreted as a negative neighborhood attributec, its effect on U can, in principle, be determined using location decisions (or backed out from housing prices using a hedonic regression).
An alternative to the revealed preference approach is the stated preference method. Stated preferences, as elicited in discrete choice experiments (DCE), rely on hypothetical choices.
The key advantage of DCEs over revealed preference studies is that it gives the researcher full freedom and control in manipulating relative positions. In particular, it is possible to include the consumption level of others into the choice set (thereby effectively internalizing it). An example of this approach is the "parallel universe" question, where one has to choose between two fictitious societies, for example one, society A, where everyone lives in a house with 3,000 square feet of floor space, and another one, society B, where the own house has 4,000 square feet while neighbors have 5,000 square feet. Frank (1999 Frank ( , 2004 contents that most people prefer society A. Solnick and Hemenway (1998) have conducted more elaborate discrete choice experiments with real populations. Interestingly, they find that leisure appears to be inconspicuous -perhaps in part because it is not so easily observed by others.
The stated preference and the revealed preference approaches both have their weaknesses.
The validity of discrete choice experiments critically hinges upon people's cognitive ability in valuing hypothetical alternatives as well as on their truthfulness in responding to such questions. DCEs generate hypothetical choice situations, which may be very far from respondent's actual experiences, and people may decide differently when faced with real choices.
The revealed preference approach makes strong assumptions regarding the rationality of agents and the functioning of markets. For example, it is well possible that individuals are 7 not aware of all relevant neighborhood attributes when they make their location decision. For long-term residents, transaction costs may prohibit a relocation in the presence of negative consumption externalities, as long as these costs are sufficiently large.
Given the limitations of the stated and revealed preference approaches, I propose to directly estimate the effect of conspicuous consumption on utility, by using stated life-and income satisfaction as a proxy for utility. Recent evidence suggests that satisfaction can be measured with a reasonable degree of reliability, sufficient to be able to compare means over time or across regions, or to use multiple regression analysis to understand the factors that affect individual satisfaction (Krueger and Schkade, 2008) . Moreover, satisfaction taps into key components of quality of life. For example, many studies have found a positive correlation between satisfaction, or happiness, and longevity. One of the mechanisms seems to be that satisfaction protects the healthy from becoming sick, by lowering stress, which in turn enhances the immune system (Veenhoven, 2008) . Studies have also shown that individuals who report higher levels of satisfaction with their lives are rated as happier by their relatives and friends, tend to smile more during social interactions, have higher prefrontal brain activity (the part of the brain associated with positive states), and are more likely to recall positive life events (Layard, 2005) .
There is a sizeable literature on the effect of relative income on satisfaction. Studies using survey data (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996 , Luttmer, 2005 , and Dynan and Ravina, 2007 usually find large negative effects of increased reference incomes ceteris paribus, holding own income constant. This evidence provides an explanation of the so called Easterlin paradox (Easterlin, 1974 ) whereby large increases in GDP over time have apparently not led to correspondingly large increases in average satisfaction.
While relative income effects may be related to conspicuous consumption, the connection between the two is not obvious. Unfortunately, direct evidence on the effect of relative consumption on satisfaction is much more sparse, perhaps due to the absence of appropriate data sets. A notable exception is Hsee et al. (2008) who report on evidence from data collected in 31 large cities in China. Participants were asked about their jewelry possessions and their satisfaction with it. The researchers found that residents of cities with more expensive jewelry were not any happier on average about their jewelry than residents of cities with less expensive jewelry (although within each city, people who owned more expensive jewelry reported greater satisfaction with their jewelry). Hsee et al. (2008) note that while some consumption experiences (such as ambient temperature, having social company etc.) are inherently evaluable and often have a natural scale, others (the size of a diamond, the horsepower of a car) are not, and hence are much more prone to social comparisons. Of course, comparison effects can also relate to past own consumption. There is evidence that hedonic adaptation plays a major role in some consumption activities, such as the size of a house or apartment, but not in others, such as the duration of a commute (Stutzer and Frey, 2008) . One factor contributing to the speed of adaptation is uncertainty: unstable or uncertain consumption experiences create longer lasting happiness than their stable and certain equivalents (Kahneman and Thaler, 1991) .
Data
The empirical analysis of this paper combines data from a number of sources: information By 2007, the nationwide number of new registrations of Ferraris and Porsches had increased substantially. The "least conspicuous" canton (with a rate of 0.08) was now the canton of Glarus. In Zug, again the canton with by far the highest density of such new sport cars, the number had almost doubled to 1.27. It has to be pointed out that the number of newly registered cars may not be the best measure for conspicuous car consumption, as it measures the flow rather than the stock of such cars. Unfortunately, stock data are not kept on file by the Federal Roads Office. In the steady state, the stock is proportional to the flow.
Income inequality data stem from the Swiss Federal Tax Administration (Jeitziner and Peters, 2007) . The SFTA publishes Gini coefficients for all municipalities and cantons of Switzerland, as well as mean income, median income and number of people living in every municipality, for selected tax years. Every Swiss resident with income has to file an annual tax return. Taxable income includes income from all sources (mainly labor earnings, interest and rental income) but excludes social security contributions (retirement and unemployment insurance). The income of jointly declaring couples is divided evenly. The resulting Gini coefficient measures personal income inequality before taxes. This is not ideal, since utility is usually derived from disposable income, and many of the channels discussed in the previous section (including reference incomes, altruism and uncertainty) are more appropriately thought of in terms of post-tax income. However, pre-and post-tax Gini coefficients are highly correlated. 
Empirical Models and Results
The effect of conspicuous consumption on satisfaction is estimated by exploiting variation in the density of Ferraris and Porsches across region and time. Are those who live in a municipality or canton with relatively more such luxury cars less satisfied than others, and if so, how large is the effect of conspicuous consumption on well-being? We would like to estimate the effect "all else equal", and therefore use regression analysis to account for potential confounders. Among them, income is perhaps the most important variable to include, since it is, first, a proxy for own consumption, and, second, a natural monetary comparison scale in order to gauge the magnitude of the consumption externality. Income is defined as annual disposable household income, i.e., net of taxes and including all transfers.
Other controls are the usual individual socio-demographic variables, an income comparison term (an indicator variable that takes the value 'one' if own income is above mean 5 Note that the two samples are not independent, as they represent repeated measurements on the same individuals and substantial positive within-person correlation is to be expected. The standard error of the average change in income satisfaction is 0.043, which leads to a t-statistic of -2.7.
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regional income, and the value 'zero' else), and finally individual and region specific fixed effects. A balanced panel is used, with 2024 person-observations in either year. The models are estimated with and without controlling for the regional income Gini coefficient. It is clear that income inequality and conspicuous consumption are closely related. People might have negative feelings about income inequality per se (Alesina et al., 2004, Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 2010) . Without controlling for income inequality, it is hard to say whether the effect of FP-ratio captures genuine conspicuous consumption, or inequality aversion more broadly. By controlling for income inequality, the specific consumption externality can be isolated in principle. The question is then whether, for a given level of inequality, people's income and life satisfaction depends on the way the money is spent by those in the upper parts of the income distribution, namely more or less conspicuously. Table 2 displays results for the municipality based analysis, Table 3 the results for the canton based analysis. There are two sets of two regressions (with and without control for the Gini, respectively), the first set for income satisfaction as dependent variable and the second set for overall life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is often conceptualized as an aggregation of various domain satisfactions, the income domain being one of them (e.g., van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004) . Since largely unobserved variation in all the different domains feed into overall life satisfaction, we would expect that the income satisfaction models have more explanatory power than the life satisfaction models. Table 2 about here − − − − − − − Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients. Household income has a statistically significant effect on both income and life satisfaction. A 10 percent increase in household income is predicted to increase income satisfaction by 0.055 points, or .7 percent if evaluated at the mean income satisfaction of 7.2. For life satisfaction, the effect is about half as large. It Table 2 , doubling that rate would have an adverse effect on predicted income satisfaction equal to that of a 5 percent reduction in income.
While the estimated conspicuous consumption parameter is negative in the life satisfaction equations as well, it is substantially smaller and no longer statistically significant.
Substantial statistically uncertainty is also present for the other regression parameters, including those capturing the effects of relative income and household size. This is in part a reflection of the study design: controlling for individual specific effects is important to guard against bias from omitted time-invariant confounders and different anchoring of the subjective response scales across individuals. With two years of data, it also cuts the degrees of freedom by half, and it eliminates from the estimation sample all persons that are observed for a single year only. The remaining sample of 2048 persons is rather small. Since regional effects are included as well, the amount of available information is further reduced.
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Given these limitations, it is even more remarkable that a statistically significant effect of the municipal FP-ratio on income satisfaction can be found.
In a next step, the analysis is repeated for a different level of spatial aggregation, the canton level. It is a-priori unclear, in what direction one would expect the results to move, as there are a number of opposing forces. For example, there is less variation of the FP-ratio between cantons than between municipalities and and the precision of the estimates can be expected to go down as a conseqence. On the other hand, since the number of new carregistrations is used as a proxy for the stock of such cars, the measurement error will tend to be lower for larger geographic units than for smaller ones (where there is a substantial fraction of municipalities with zero new registrations in a given year). From a substantial point of view, the spatial dimension of the consumption externality remains ambiguous. In the cantons, which are the bigger units, inhabitants in the different parts of the units are unlikely to know of, and respond to, the behavior of each other. While it is obviously the case that cars are used to drive around, inside and outside the canton, it is also arguably the case that the exposure to such consumption externalities is the greatest at the local level, and most so in the immediate neighborhood.
− − − − −− Table 3 about here − − − − − − − Table 3 shows the regression results for the analysis at the cantonal level. The regressions models and estimation samples are identical to those used for Table 2 , except that the FPratio and Gini coefficient are measured at the level of the canton, and that canton rather than municipality specific fixed effects are included in addition to the individual specific fixed effects. It turns out that the FP-ratio point estimates effects are actually larger than before, 6 The regional effects are identified from movers.
16
in absolute value, in particular in the life satisfaction equations. However, standard errors have grown much so that none of the negative point estimates is statistically significant.
Conclusions
The first objective of this paper was to explore the life satisfaction approach as a conceptual framework for thinking about conspicuous consumption and consumption externalities. The traditional tools of welfare analysis identify externalities from behavioral responses. This limits the scope of questions one can answer. It is for example difficult to quantify the welfare loss resulting from envy, or to quantify the disutility of an externality, or the utility of a public good, more broadly. To value such intangibles, the satisfaction approach offers a potential alternative.
The second objective was to conduct a substantive empirical analysis for Switzerland and to determine the welfare costs of luxury sport cars. The results indicated that people living in a municipality with a higher prevalence of luxury cars have indeed a lower income satisfaction than others, ceteris paribus. Doubling the number of Ferraris and Porsche at the national average is estimated to have an adverse effect on mean income satisfaction that equals that of a 5 percent reduction in income. The results for life satisfaction and cantonal spillovers were inconclusive, although negative point estimates were found as well.
Of course, areas with many Ferraris and Porsches are also likely to have more buyers of other expensive cars, and a higher incidence of other displays of wealth (such as luxury condominiums). Without explicitly controlling for these factors, the Ferrari and Porsche density can best be interpreted as a proxy for the overall amount of conspicuous consumption that is taking place. The basic assumption is that the more Ferraris and Porsches there are in a municipality or canton, the higher the incidence of conspicuous consumption, whatever its specific manifestation. The effects should thus not be interpreted as ceteris paribus (keeping other forms of such conspicuous consumption constant) but rather mutatis mutandis.
Future work in this area should aim at improving statistical power. Table 2 .
